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INTRODUCTION
Despite high drama, the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion  on  Climate  Change  (UNFCCC)  conference,  held  in 
Copenhagen  between  December  7  and  18,  2009,  ended  as 
a flop.1 The failure to secure a comprehensive treaty came as 
no surprise: hopes for the Copenhagen conference to wrap up 
two years of negotiations with a successor treaty to the Kyoto 
Protocol  had  faded  long  before  December.2  But  it  was  still 
disappointing that so little was accomplished, especially after 
President Barack Obama, Premier Wen Jiabao, and over 100 
world leaders decided (at the last moment) to join thousands 
of delegates, environmentalists, and climate activists in Copen-
hagen. Our own benchmarks for a reasonable outcome from 
Copenhagen include much greater specificity as to targets, time 
1. The conference is formally known as the 15th Session of the Conference of 
the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(COP 15) and the Fifth Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP 5).
2. At the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP 13) meeting of the UNFCCC 
in Bali in December 2007, countries agreed to launch a two-year process of 
negotiations to write a successor accord to the Kyoto Protocol. This negotiat-
ing process was scheduled to be concluded at the UNFCCC meetings in 
Copenhagen in December 2009.
paths, and control measures by major emitting countries; more 
detailed commitments on financial support and conditionality 
terms for developing countries; and acceptance by all major 
emitters, whether developed or developing countries, of robust 
and independent monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) 
standards. We do not place great stress on the legal form of the 
ultimate agreement, whether a treaty or a political accord or 
something in between (Werksman and Herbertson 2009), but 
we do think the sense of obligation must be equivalent between 
all major emitters. Again, equivalence was not achieved. 
A three-page political document known as the “Copen-
hagen Accord” was originally brokered by the United States 
together with Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (the so-
called “BASIC” countries), with another 20 countries in the 
supporting cast.3 Both because the deal was crafted behind 
closed doors, and because it committed major emitting coun-
tries to very little in terms of emission reductions, finance, 
or technology transfer, it encountered strong opposition from 
Sudan, Venezuela,  Bolivia,  and  a  few  other  countries.  The 
UNFCCC works by consensus, and the full assemblage of 
member countries refused to approve the Copenhagen Accord; 
however, after pleading by the Danish chairman, the member 
countries agreed to “take note of” the document. In separate 
decisions, the countries agreed to extend ongoing negotiations 
under two working groups through their next meetings that 
will be held in Mexico in December 2010.5
3. The full text of the Copenhagen Accord is available at www.unfccc.int. 
Some 25 countries participated in drafting the accord, largely represented at 
the head of state level (except for BASIC countries, which were represented at 
a lower level by their own choice). Algeria and Ethiopia participated on behalf 
of the African Group, Grenada and the Maldives on behalf of the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS) countries, Bangladesh on behalf of less developed 
countries (LDCs), etc. When the Danish tried to introduce the accord for a 
formal COP decision, five countries spoke out against it: Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Available at www1.cop15.meta-fusion.
com. 
. UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer described the concept of “taking 
note” as “a way of recognizing that something is there, but not going so far as 
to directly associate yourself with it.” See Cryderman, Kelly. 2009. Copenha-
gen winds down with non-binding agreement.  National Post. (December 19). 
Available at www.nationalpost.com.
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Some leaders characterized the outcome as a meaningful 
first step toward a future climate treaty, but most commenta-
tors painted the accord as a failure both because it is nonbind-
ing and more importantly because it is deliberately short on 
specifics and vaguely phrased. Fingers were pointed. More 
fundamentally, it seems doubtful that a UN process, working 
by consensus, will ever deliver an ambitious and legally bind-
ing treaty.
To  make  things  worse,  over  the  past  months,  climate 
science came under siege. In the wake of the “climategate” 
email scandal, scientific evidence used by the 2007 Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report—which 
is  considered  the  climate  change  “bible”—was  revealed  to 
contain flaws. Perhaps most embarrassing, the assertion in the 
2007 IPCC report that Himalaya Glaciers would disappear by 
2035 was poorly substantiated. The statement that 55 percent 
of the Netherlands lies below sea level is wrong. Other claims 
in  the  report—for  example,  the  adverse  impact  of  climate 
change on African crop yields and Amazon forests—are being 
challenged. These revelations triggered a fresh wave of doubt, 
especially among climate skeptics such as editorial writers in 
the Wall Street Journal. The contemporaneous resignation of 
UN climate Chief Yvo de Boer served as icing on the cake.
Copenhagen Frenzy 
When  the  Copenhagen  conference  was  just  a  few  weeks 
away, hundreds of internal emails hacked from a server used 
by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU), a prominent British 
climate research center at the University of East Anglia, were 
published online. Climate skeptics—a small but vocal minor-
ity—seized on the juiciest emails as proof that establishment 
scientists had smothered disagreement using dirty tricks. The 
to the Kyoto Protocol. The first track covers UNFCCC negotiations to fulfill 
the Bali Action Plan adopted at the 13th UNFCCC COP meeting held in 
Indonesia in 2007. This negotiating process is conducted and overseen by the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). 
The second track covers the Kyoto Protocol negotiations that focus on further 
commitments from Annex I parties under the Kyoto Protocol. This process is 
conducted and overseen by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commit-
ments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). The text of 
decision x/CP.15 on the AWG-LCA and the text of decision x/CMP.5 on the 
AWG-KP are available at www.unfccc.int. The Copenhagen Accord endorsed 
both decisions. The United States is classified as an Annex I party under the 
UNFCCC. However, because the United States is not a signatory to the Kyoto 
Protocol, it has formally participated only in the AWG-LCA negotiations, not 
in the AWG-KP negotiations. 
. For example, the British Climate Secretary Ed Miliband accused China, 
Sudan, Bolivia, and some Latin American countries of trying to hijack the UN 
climate summit and “hold the world to ransom” in order to block a binding 
deal. See Vidal, John. 2009. Ed Miliband: China tried to hijack Copenhagen 
climate deal. Guardian. (December 20). Available at www.guardian.co.uk.
“climategate” scandal did nothing good for the global atmo-
spherics—though it had little impact on negotiations within 
Copenhagen. As the emails showed, lively scientific disagree-
ment rages as to whether climate change is indeed happening, 
and if so whether it can be attributed to human activity. The 
strong argument for success at Copenhagen was never that 
anthropogenic climate change is proven beyond doubt, but 
rather that the severe risks associated with global warming 
warrant significant “insurance payments” through limits on 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. On that basis, the Copen-
hagen negotiators sought to address several thorny questions.
Whither the Kyoto Protocol? 
A challenging question that occupied lots of time and energy 
was whether the Kyoto Protocol should be retained as a foun-
dation stone or instead be buried and forgotten. Many coun-
tries—especially  developing  countries—want  to  retain  the 
basic structure of the Kyoto Protocol because it lays primary 
responsibility for action at the doorstep of developed coun-
tries. In opposition, the United States and a few other devel-
oped countries insist on a departure from the current legal 
framework in which international obligations apply only to 
them. 
Among several draft texts that were tabled, two propos-
als gained the most attention. The disputes surrounding these 
proposals illustrate the huge division between countries on 
the fundamental legal framework for any future international 
climate agreement. 
Early in the Copenhagen talks, a leaked draft document, 
the so-called “Danish text,” prepared by the Danish govern-
ment in consultation with a few other developed countries, 
infuriated developing countries. It was interpreted as a means 
of  sidelining  the  United  Nations  and  forcing  developing 
countries to agree to specific emission targets.7 While experts 
7. The Danish text, dated November 27, 2009, that was leaked to the Guard-
ian states that: “The developing country Parties, except the least developed 
countries, which may contribute at their own discretion, commit to nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions, including actions supported and enabled 
by technology, financing, and capacity building. The developing countries’ 
individual mitigation action could in aggregate yield a [Y percent] deviation 
in [2020] from business as usual and yielding their collective emissions peak 
before [20XX] and decline thereafter.” The Danish text that was leaked to 
the Guardian is available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/dat-
ablog/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-summit-text-danish-wordle. Another 
Guardian article also reported some details of a confidential analysis of the 
Danish text by developing countries. In their opinion, the text would: “Force 
developing countries to agree to specific emission cuts and measures that were 
not part of the original UN agreement; Divide poor countries further by 
creating a new category of developing countries called ‘the most vulnerable’; 
Weaken the UN’s role in handling climate finance; Not allow poor countries 
to emit more than 1. tonnes of carbon per person by 2050, while allowing N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 4   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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warned  against  an  overreaction  to  this  sketchy  document, 
since it was just one of many proposals drafted by different 
groups of countries, the “Danish text” was seen by members 
of  the  Group  of  77  (G-77)  as  an  unacceptable  departure 
from principles agreed under the Kyoto Protocol and the Bali 
Action Plan. 
Splits were witnessed not only between developed and 
developing countries but also among developing countries. 
Reflecting concerns of the most vulnerable countries, Tuvalu, 
a  small  Pacific  island,  proposed  a  new  deal  that  embraced 
tougher  targets—for  example,  limiting  global  atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations to 350 parts per million (ppm) and global 
temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial 
level—and require the major developing countries to accept 
legally binding obligations by amending the Kyoto Protocol. 
The Tuvalu proposal was backed by the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS), some African countries, and most members 
of the G-77. While this ambitious initiative was blocked by 
large developing countries, notably China, India, and Saudi 
Arabia, it is meaningful that small countries spoke up for their 
own interests, even as the G-77 forum plus China, numbering 
about 130 developing countries, was working to establish a 
common negotiating position.8 Taukiei Kitara, head of Tuva-
lu’s delegation, acknowledged that the proposal marked the 
first serious rift in the previously united front between the G-
77 and China.9 The proposal calls for binding commitments 
from major developing countries, starting with China, India, 
and Brazil—meaning that the Kyoto principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” is to be interpreted differ-
ently for major and minor emitters among developing coun-
rich countries to emit 2.7 tonnes.” See Vidal, John. 2009. Copenhagen 
climate summit in disarray after ‘Danish text’ leak. Guardian. (December 8). 
Available at www.guardian.co.uk. 
8. The Group of 77 (G-77 that was established in 19 with 77 developing 
countries signatories now has 130 member countries. 
9. See “Copenhagen climate summit: Cracks appear in consensus of develop-
ing nation bloc,” Telegraph, December 9, 2009 (available at http://www.
telegraph.co.uk).
tries (Hufbauer and Kim 2009a). The Tuvalu initiative implies 
an important departure from the traditional dichotomy that 
divides the world into just two groups, developing and devel-
oped countries, and imposes few obligations on members of 
the developing country group.10
Amid the chaotic negotiations and fundamental disagree-
ment on the legal framework for a post-Kyoto deal, on the 
last day of negotiations, the heads of five states—President 
Barack Obama of the United States, Premier Wen Jiabao of 
China, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India, President 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and President Jacob Zuma 
of South Africa—sat together to salvage the conference with a 
document, the so-called Copenhagen Accord. Unfortunately 
the accord is so lacking in substance that it can only be char-
acterized as a small step toward meaningful limits on GHG 
emissions. 
The Copenhagen Accord 
The best feature of the Copenhagen Accord is that it put the 
signatures of several major emitting countries on the same 
piece of paper. At this juncture, the list of all countries that 
have assented to the accord has not been published, but it 
remains open for signature, and the total list of signatories will 
probably be published within a few months. However, since 
the Copenhagen conference concluded a two-year negotiating 
process that was supposed to end in hard commitments at least 
by all major emitters, the accord (even with lots of signatures) 
can only be characterized as the beginning of a long process.
To  its  credit,  the  Copenhagen  Accord  does  reiterate 
the core elements envisaged in the Bali Action Plan: finan-
cial  support,  technology  transfer,  reducing  emissions  from 
deforestation and degradation (REDD), and obligations for 
measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV). The accord 
adds to this list a cap on the permitted rise in the average 
global temperature of 2 degrees Celsius above the preindustrial 
level (the current average global temperature is 0.7 degrees 
Celsius above the preindustrial baseline). But the accord is 
vaguely phrased and awfully short on specifics. Specifics in 
earlier versions of the Copenhagen Accord, but scrapped in 
the drafting process, included a timeline for reaching a bind-
ing agreement by the end of 2010 and hard targets for the 
global reduction in GHG emissions (50 percent cut by 2050 
for all countries and 80 percent cut for developed countries). 
Reportedly, both features were vetoed by China and India. 
10. UK Climate Minister Ed Miliband noted in his Guardian article that “the 
old order of developed versus developing has been replaced by more interest-
ing alliances.” See “The road from Copenhagen” Ed Miliband, Guardian, 
December 20, 2009 (available at www.guardian.co.uk).
The best feature of the Copenhagen Accord, 
brokered by the United States with the 
support of Brazil, South Africa, India, and 
China (the “BASIC” countries), is that it put 
the signatures of several major emitting 
countries on the same piece of paper.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 4   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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On December 19, 2009, the draft agreed by the United 
States and four BASIC countries was presented to all UNFCCC 
delegations for their approval. What these five countries got 
was not approval but stinging rebukes. Lumumba Di-Aping, 
a Sudanese diplomat representing the G-77, denounced the 
accord  by  likening  it  to  “the  holocaust.”11  Displaying  her 
bleeding  palm  to  grab  attention,  the  Venezuelan  delegate 
asserted that international agreements cannot be imposed by 
a small and exclusive group.12 Amidst the storm of criticism, 
the Copenhagen conference could only agree to “take note” of 
the accord. 
Following is a short assessment of core elements envis-
aged in the Copenhagen Accord.
The 2 Degrees Celsius Cap
The  Copenhagen  Accord  agrees  to  limit  the  rise  of  global 
average temperature to 2 degrees Celsius above the average 
preindustrial  level.  The  accord  states:  “We  agree  that  deep 
cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and 
as documented by the [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change]  IPCC  Fourth  Assessment  Report,  with  a  view  to 
reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global 
temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet 
this  objective  consistent  with  science  and  on  the  basis  of 
equity…”
While reaching agreement on the 2 degrees Celsius cap 
was certainly important, and a benchmark widely endorsed by 
experts as insurance against catastrophic effects, the cap did 
not go beyond what leaders had already agreed at the Group 
of  Eight  (G-8)  Summit  and  the  Major  Economies  Forum 
(convened in the sidelines of the G-8 Summit), in L’Aquila, 
11. See Lean, Geoffrey. 2009. Copenhagen: a world at war over its future. 
Telegraph. (December 21). Available at www.telegraph.co.uk.
12. See Vidal, John, and Jonathan Watts. 2009. Copenhagen: The last-ditch 
drama that saved the deal from collapse. Guardian. (December 20). Available 
at www.guardian.co.uk. 
Italy, in July 2009. Moreover, in terms of specific targets for 
reducing GHG emissions, the accord fell short of what G-8 
Summit leaders had agreed.13 
The 2 degrees Celsius cap must be counted as a major 
achievement, since it will be a daunting task—on the current 
trajectory of GHG emissions—to limit the average temperature 
rise to 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. The aver-
age temperature has already risen by 0.7 degrees Celsius over 
the past 100 years, with most of the warming occurring in the 
past 50 years (IPCC 2007a). The abundance of atmospheric 
CO2 has increased to about 380 ppm in 2005 compared with 
approximately 280 ppm in the preindustrial period. Many stud-
ies predict that, in the absence of concerted action, the level of 
GHG concentrations (mainly but not entirely CO2) will reach 
550 ppm by 2050, almost double the preindustrial level, and 
that this concentration will force the average temperature to rise 
between 2 degrees Celsius to 5 degrees Celsius.1 
To stay within the 2 degrees Celsius cap, it seems essen-
tial to establish both mid-term and long-term global emis-
sion  targets.  Disappointingly,  the  Copenhagen  Accord  did 
not set collective hard targets, even though such targets were 
apparently in the text of earlier drafts. The IPCC (2007b) 
recommended that, to stabilize GHG concentrations at 50 
ppm,  Annex  I  parties  (developed  countries)  should  reduce 
their collective GHG emissions by 25 to 0 percent below 
1990 levels by 2020 and by 80 to 95 percent by 2050. These 
targets have been prominently promoted by some countries 
and experts. Moreover, to stabilize GHG concentrations in 
the atmosphere, annual emissions should reach a peak level 
within this century and then begin a steady decline. However, 
the accord only vaguely speaks about a timeline for peak emis-
sions, stating that “We should cooperate in achieving the peak-
ing of global and national emissions as soon as possible.”15
13. The G-8 leaders agreed that the increase in the global average temperature 
should not exceed the 2 degrees Celsius above the preindustrial level. As an 
action measure, the G-8 leaders declared that GHG emissions should be cut 
by 80 percent for developed countries and by 50 percent for all countries by 
2050, compared with levels in 1990 (or a more recent year). While 17 leaders 
at the Major Economies Forum (MEF) agreed on the 2 degrees Celsius cap 
and promised further talks on global targets, they refused to endorse a 2050 
target, due to resistance from developing countries. The full text of the com-
muniqué of the 2009 G-8 Summit is available at www.g8italia2009.it.
1. In climate change modeling and projections, the concept of “climate 
sensitivity” is critical. This parameter measures how climate responds to 
sustained radiative forcing, defined as the amount of global average surface 
warming following a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations. The 1990 
IPCC TAR (third assessment report) estimated climate sensitivity in the range 
of 1.5 degrees Celsius to .5 degrees Celsius with a best estimate of 2.5 degrees 
Celsius. Later, the 2007 IPCC fourth assessment report raised its estimated 
range of climate sensitivity to 2 degrees Celsius to .5 degrees Celsius, with a 
best estimate of about 3 degrees Celsius.
15. For example, the IPCC (2007a) estimated that the stabilization of CO2 
concentration at 350 to 00 ppm (GHG concentration at 5 to 90 ppm) 
To its credit, the Copenhagen Accord does 
reiterate the core elements envisaged in 
the Bali Action Plan: financial support, 
technology transfer, reducing emissions 
from deforestation and degradation 
(REDD), and obligations for measurement, 
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Instead  of  setting  collective  mid-term  and  long-term 
targets, the accord asks Annex I Parties to submit individu-
ally or jointly quantified economywide emissions targets for 
the year 2020, using the format of Appendix I attached to 
the accord, while it asks non-Annex I parties to list volun-
tary pledges reciting mitigation actions, using the format of 
Appendix  II.  The  initial  deadline  for  both  submissions—
which is “flexible” according to the UNFCCC— was January 
31, 2010.1 Meeting the deadline, about 10 Annex I Parties 
(including  the  European  Union  as  a  group)  and  20  non-
Annex I Parties submitted their emissions reduction plans to 
the UNFCCC. Many of the targets and actions submitted 
by countries relating to the Copenhagen Accord have closely 
resembled what they put forward before heading to Copenha-
gen but with some conditionality attached to national pledges. 
Plans of major emitting countries inscribed in Appendices of 
the Copenhagen Accord are following: 
Appendix I for Annex I Parties (quantified economywide 
emissions targets for 2020)17 
n	 The United States: an emissions cut in the range of 17 
percent from 2005 levels “in conformity with anticipated 
US energy and climate legislation”;
n	 Canada: a 17 percent cut from 2005 levels, which is “to be 
will require CO2 emissions to peak by 2015.
1. UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer later described the January 31 
deadline as a “soft” deadline. He said, “I do not expect everyone to meet the 
deadline. Countries are not being asked if they want to adhere… but to indi-
cate if they want to be associated [with the Copenhagen accord].” See Vidal, 
John. 2010. UN drops deadline for countries to state climate change targets. 
Guardian. (January 20). Available at www.guardian.co.uk.
17. Information provided by Annex I Parties relating to Appendix I of the 
Copenhagen Accord is available at http://unfccc.int/home/items/52.php. As 
of February 1, 2010, the list of Annex I parties that have submitted their plans 
to the UNFCCC includes: Australia, Canada, Croatia, the European Union, 
Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia Federation, and the United 
States. 
aligned with the final economywide emissions target of the 
United States in enacted legislation”;
n	 Japan: a 25 percent cut from 1990 levels which is premised 
on “the establishment of a fair and effective international 
framework” involving all major economies;
n	 The European Union: a 20 percent cut from 1990 levels 
and possible 30 percent cut if other developed countries 
commit to “comparable emission reductions” and develop-
ing countries contribute adequately;
Appendix II for non-Annex I Parties (nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions of developing country parties)18 
n	 China:  0  to  5  percent  cut  in  carbon  intensity  (CO2 
emissions per unit of GDP) from 2005 levels by 2020, and 
increase in the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy 
consumption to around 15 percent by 2020 and in forest 
coverage; 
n	 India: 20 to 25 percent cut in carbon intensity from 2005 
levels by 2020;
n	 South  Africa:  a  3  percent  cut  from  business-as-usual 
(BAU) levels by 2020; 
n	 Brazil: 3 to 39 percent cut from BAU levels by 2020.
According  to  Levin  and  Bradley  (2010)  of  the  World 
Resources Institute, pledges made by Annex I Parties under 
the Copenhagen Accord amount to overall 12 to 19 percent 
reduction of emissions below 1990 levels by 2020. 19 They 
fall far short of the range of emissions reduction—25 to 0 
percent—that the IPCC have called for in order to stabilize 
concentrations of CO2e at 50 ppm. Levin and Bradley also 
added that if the pledges are not increased, the additional 
reductions required between 2020 and 2050 would be signifi-
cant, with emissions dropping roughly 2.5 percent annually to 
reach a goal of 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. 
The structure of the Copenhagen Accord differs in an 
18. Information provided by non-Annex I Parties relating to Appendix II of 
the Copenhagen Accord is available at http://unfccc.int/home/items/525.
php, As of February 1, 2010, the list of non-Annex I parties that have submit-
ted their plans to the UNFCCC includes: Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, 
Georgia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, 
Marshall Islands, Moldova, Morocco, Republic of Congo, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. 
19. This assessment is based on pledges submitted by Annex I Parties (namely 
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, 
the United States) under the Copenhagen Accord as well as pledges by Belarus 
and Ukraine, which were expected to associate them with the accord soon. 
Under the Copenhagen Accord, developed 
countries agreed to provide new and 
additional resources, reaching collectively 
$30 billion for the period 2010–12 to 
support mitigation and adaptation 
activities of developing countries.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 4   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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important way from the Kyoto Protocol. Kyoto announced a 
collective target—an average reduction in GHG emissions of 
5.2 percent from the 1990 level by 2012—and then allocated 
specific targets to individual Annex I parties. By contrast, the 
Copenhagen  negotiations  resulted  in  a  bottom-up  accord, 
since  few  countries  came  to  the  conference  ready  to  have 
their own policy determined by the tug-and-haul of inter-
national negotiations leading to legally binding targets.20 At 
this juncture it appears that Copenhagen entirely depends on 
the success of future agreements to earn a favorable grade in 
the history books. And in our judgment, future agreements 
will not succeed where Copenhagen failed unless the struc-
ture and dynamics of future climate negotiations are radically 
revamped. 
The accord calls for a review of national implementation 
measures by 2015. The review will also reconsider the long-
term temperature cap of 2 degrees Celsius, and instead perhaps 
set a cap of 1.5 degrees Celsius. This aspect of the review was 
designed to provide comfort to small island states, along with 
African  and  Latin  American  countries,  which  collectively 
called for negotiations leading to a 1.5 degrees Celsius cap. 
Financial Support
Under the Copenhagen Accord, developed countries agreed 
to provide new and additional resources, reaching collectively 
$30 billion for the period 2010–12 to support mitigation and 
adaptation activities of developing countries. Provided that 
developing countries undertake meaningful mitigation action, 
with transparency as to the results, the developed countries 
also committed to a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion 
a year by 2020, to address the needs of developing countries. 
The accord calls for the establishment of a Copenhagen Green 
Climate  Fund  as  one  funding  channel  and  a  “High  Level 
Panel” to examine ways of meeting the 2020 finance goal of 
$100 billion a year.
The  sums  mentioned  fall  well  short  of  what  develop-
ing countries have asked (though, of course, their demands 
contain a generous margin for negotiation). Developing coun-
tries insist that developed countries should set aside a “climate 
fund” (our term) equivalent to between 0.5 and 1 percent 
of their annual GDP to assist the mitigation and adaptation 
efforts of developing countries. In current dollar terms, this 
would amount to between $200 billion to $00 billion annu-
ally for all 30 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
20. This appraisal is based on an email exchange with Trevor Houser, a former 
senior advisor to US special envoy on climate change. 
Development (OECD) members.21 These figures, of course, 
contain a generous margin for negotiation, and remain to be 
supported by detailed cost and damage assessments. Equally 
important, in sizing up the potential magnitude of financial 
support, is a comparison with the level of bilateral official 
development  assistance  (ODA)  from  23  OECD  members: 
around $85 billion in 2008. In previous papers, we suggested 
that an annual “climate fund” more than twice the size of 
current  bilateral  ODA  seems  remote,  though  such  figures 
are prominent (Hufbauer and Kim 2009a and 2010 forth-
coming). We also suggested that large-scale financial support 
will only come if it is tightly connected to significant GHG 
reduction in major developing countries, verified by rigorous 
measurement,  reporting,  and  verification  (MRV)  standards 
(Hufbauer and Kim 2009b). Our suggestions seem to have 
been borne out by the Copenhagen Accord. The Copenhagen 
Accord acknowledged the importance of MRV in relation to 
mitigation action and finance. We discuss this aspect further 
in the next section. 
The accord is vague as to criteria for supplying and allo-
cating funding. It states that: “Funding for adaptation will be 
prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, such 
as the least developed countries, small island developing states, 
and Africa” and funding for $100 billion per year by 2020 
will come from “a wide variety of sources, public and private, 
bilateral  and  multilateral,  including  alternative  sources  of 
finance.” Despite two years of prior negotiations, the delega-
tions meeting in Copenhagen had not reached agreement on 
criteria for spending climate money or the sources of finance. 
At Copenhagen, George Soros proposed that special draw-
ing rights allocated to developed countries be tapped as one 
source of finance, but this proposal, like others, remains to be 
thrashed out in future negotiations.22 
Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV)
The Copenhagen Accord does not address MRV issues sepa-
rately,  but  rather  in  the  context  of  mitigation  action  and 
financial  support.  The  Copenhagen  Accord  recognizes  that 
emissions  reductions  and  financing  by  developed  countries 
will be measured, reported, and verified in accordance with 
guidelines adopted by the Conference of Parties (COP). For 
non-Annex I parties, mitigation actions will be subject to their 
own domestic MRV standards, but non-Annex I parties are 
21. According to the OECD, in 2008 the total GDP for all 30 OECD mem-
ber countries was $0,01 billion (at current prices and purchasing power 
parities).
22. The Soros proposal can be found at www.europeanclimate.org.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 4   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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asked to communicate information on the implementation of 
their actions through National Communications, “with provi-
sions for international consultations and analysis under clearly 
defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is 
respected.” 
In climate talks, MRV has been a thorny issue between 
developed  and  developing  countries.  Under  the  current 
UNFCCC  and  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  MRV  requirements 
substantially differ between Annex I and non-Annex I parties: 
they are stringent for Annex I parties, but weaker for non-
Annex I parties. At Copenhagen, negotiators from the United 
States  and  some  developed  countries  urged  that  voluntary 
actions  by  developing  countries  should  be  independently 
measured, reported, and verified. China and India refused. 
The compromise in the accord was to call for “international 
consultation and analysis” of emissions and domestic mitiga-
tion actions by developing countries.23 
The accord also calls for a registry to report nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) for countries that 
are seeking international support, along with relevant tech-
nology, finance, and capacity building measures. Supported 
NAMAs will be subject to international measurement, report-
ing, and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by 
the COP. 
These  requirements  seem  to  reflect  strong  demands  to 
address the issue of “transparency”—notably demands by the 
United States. US Secretary of State Clinton and President 
Obama both emphasized enhanced transparency during their 
remarks in Copenhagen. When announcing that the United 
States is willing to make a contribution to a global fund of 
$100 billion fund per year, Secretary Clinton stressed that the 
US offer is conditional on developing countries making their 
mitigation actions transparent and verified. The accord does 
not suggest that international MRV requirements apply to 
all countries, but only to countries that receive international 
support. Large and successful developing countries, exempli-
fied by China, are unlikely to be subject to MRV requirements, 
since they can finance mitigation action on their own. More-
over, few developed countries will willingly provide support 
23. Under the current UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I parties 
are required to submit detailed reports on emissions of all six GHGs annually 
in accordance with guidelines established by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and each submission is subject to review by an expert 
team. At this juncture, the expert teams simply review the methodologies used 
by the statistical authorities in the Annex I parties, but in the future the teams 
might enhance the level scrutiny if resources permit. Non-Annex I parties are 
required to submit GHG reports only as part of their National Communica-
tions, which do not have to meet IPCC guidelines. However, the reports are 
subject to consideration by international experts. At Copenhagen, developing 
countries agreed that these reports should be submitted every two years and 
cover emissions and actions. 
to a country (China) that holds foreign exchange reserves in 
excess of $2 trillion. China made it clear that it does not expect 
to be a first candidate for funding even though it will continue 
to seek funding for other developing countries.2 
The difference in MRV requirements under the accord 
left open the important and tricky question as to when border 
measures  can  be  properly  implemented  to  address  climate 
concerns.25 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD)
One notable element of the Copenhagen Accord was its recog-
nition of the role of REDD activities. Without specifics, the 
accord states: “We recognize the crucial role of reducing emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation and the need 
to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emissions by forests 
and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such 
actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism, 
including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial 
resources from developed countries.”2 
The UNFCCC has recognized the mitigation potential 
from Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) 
activities under both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
However,  due  to  various  uncertainties,  the  Kyoto  Protocol 
excluded REDD activities from its offset mechanisms (notably 
the Clean Development Mechanism, CDM)—but included 
reforestation and related activity. Given the important role of 
forests in the global carbon cycle,27 many developing coun-
2. See Hsu, Angel, and Christopher Kieran. 2009. China in Copenhagen 
Day 3: Tuvalu raises the bar, China reacts. Climate Progress. (December 9). 
Available at www.climateprogress.org.
25. Border issues are explored in detail in Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim 
(2009).
2. REDD refers both to activities to avoid deforestation and forest degrada-
tion and to mechanisms to provide incentives for such activities. REDD was 
introduced as a UNFCCC agenda item when Papua New Guinea and Costa 
Rica, supported by eight other parties, proposed to accommodate REDD into 
mechanisms of the UNFCCC at the 11th COP meeting in Montreal in De-
cember 2005. Two years later, the Bali Action Plan, adopted at the 13th UN-
FCCC COP meeting in Indonesia in 2007, called for “policy approaches and 
positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
in developing countries.” This comprehensive approach would extend REDD 
to include “conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement 
of forest carbon stocks” and is often referred to as REDD-plus (REDD +).
27. The World Bank (2009) estimated that net global deforestation was 
7.3 million hectares on an annual average basis between 2000 and 2005, 
contributing about 5 gigatons of CO2 a year in emissions. According to the 
IPCC (2007a), deforestation and degradation accounted for about 17 percent 
of global GHG emissions in 200.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 4   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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tries—especially forest-rich countries—argue that REDD can 
play an integral role in mitigating climate change and deserves 
to serve as a channel for needed funds. While a loose consen-
sus  has  emerged  that  the  climate  talks  for  the  post-Kyoto 
regime should address REDD, many observers are wary about 
schemes that would reward developing countries for protect-
ing their forests. Put baldly, the concept sounds too much like 
a bribe not to do bad things. Future climate talks will need 
to resolve the “moral hazard” issue and draw clear guidelines. 
One challenge for building a coherent REDD mechanism into 
the future international climate architecture is to strengthen 
capacity in developing countries. Among other things, robust 
MRV standards and enhanced MRV capabilities are essential 
to gauge carbon emissions and carbon sinks associated with 
forest activity. 
Technology
Reflecting  the  contentious  character  of  technology  transfer 
issues, the Copenhagen Accord is awfully short on details. 
The accord only proposes to establish a technology mecha-
nism to accelerate technology development and transfer for 
both  mitigation  and  adaptation.  Technological  innovation 
holds great appeal since scientific breakthroughs could deliver 
a huge reduction in GHG emissions at low cost. Develop-
ing  countries  have  asserted  that  technology  transfer,  either 
free or on bargain terms, is an essential prerequisite for their 
own  mitigation  actions.  Developed  countries  acknowledge 
the importance of technology transfer, but they emphasize the 
importance of financial incentives for firms to discover new 
technology that can limit GHG emissions at reasonable cost. 
Copenhagen did nothing to narrow the gap between these 
contending positions.28 
Trade Issues 
Even though the Copenhagen Accord is silent over trade-relat-
ed issues, the tension over trade and competitiveness issues 
was  palpable  during  negotiations. While  the  United  States 
sought a meaningful agreement that holds accountable large 
28. According to Inside US Trade, an earlier version of the draft text on 
“technology transfer” included some options on intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). One option was an assertion that developing countries’ existing rights 
under the WTO to make use of compulsory licensing could be extended to 
technology related to climate change. Another option was to create a global 
pool of patents that would ensure access to IPR-protected climate technologies 
to developing countries “on non-exclusive royalty-free terms.” See Border 
Measure Ban, IPR Provisions Pose Hurdles For Copenhagen Deal. 2009. 
Inside US Trade. (December 18). (Accessed via subscription.)
developing countries, exemplified by China, India, and Brazil, 
the United States also pushed hard for the right to impose 
border measures on imports to be included in a draft deal. 
Jairam Ramesh, the chief negotiator for India, made it clear 
that India is totally opposed and expressed his intention to 
bring a case to the WTO if developed countries pursue border 
measures.29  In  parallel,  many  developing  countries  pressed 
developed countries to renounce any use of border measures 
as part of their domestic climate policies.30 
In  the  US  legislative  process  competitiveness  concerns 
have been dominant, reflecting fears that mandatory programs 
embraced by developed nations will simply erode their own 
competitiveness  with  no  reduction  in  global  GHG  emis-
sions.  The  Waxman-Markey  bill  that  was  passed  in  June 
2009 contemplates trade restrictions, for the most part to be 
imposed after 2020, against US trading partners that do not 
undertake similar climate action. The companion bill debated 
in the Senate also includes trade measures to address competi-
tiveness concerns.31 
Wide differences over the potential role of trade measures 
indicate how remote chances are that, under the UNFCCC 
process, parties to the post-Kyoto accord will adopt binding 
rules that define a trade framework. Moreover, the rigid resis-
tance of China and India to legally binding commitments, 
evidenced throughout the course of Copenhagen talks, will 
intensify  competitive  concerns  in Washington  and  perhaps 
other capital cities. Trade restrictive measures in a US cap-
and-trade program now seem all but certain. Other developed 
countries may follow suit. 
Climate policy options that are now well advanced in US 
legislation (and draft legislation in other developed countries) 
contemplate immediate overt subsidies in the form of free 
allowances, and quasi-subsidies in the form of sector exemp-
tions,  as  well  as  deferred  border  adjustment  mechanisms 
29. See Kanter, James. 2009. At Climate Talks, Trade Pressures Mount. New 
York Times. (December 17). Available at www.nytimes.com.
30. The earlier version of the draft agreement developed by AWG-LCA 
proposed options to address trade related concerns: (1) ban the use of border 
measures that would restrict imports of carbon-intensive products; (2) merely 
urge parties to take into account trade-related language in the UNFCCC; or 
(3) commit parties not to impose measures that constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. 
See Border Measure Ban, IPR Provisions Pose Hurdles For Copenhagen Deal. 
2009. Inside US Trade. (December 18). (Accessed via subscription.) 
31. In June 2009, the US House of Representatives narrowly passed its energy 
and climate bill, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA, 
also known as the Waxman-Markey bill) and the Senate has been working 
on the draft bill, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (S. 1733, 
also known as the Kerry-Boxer bill). Both comprehensive energy and climate 
bills contain provisions related to energy efficiency and renewable electricity 
standards, investment in green and clean energy, and a cap-and-trade program 
to control emissions from major sources. N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 4   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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applied  to  imports  from  “nonconforming  countries”  (our 
term). These measures, designed to address competitiveness 
concerns both for exports and imports, will almost certainly 
discriminate between domestic producers and foreign produc-
ers and among different foreign producers. A verbal backlash 
against the gamut of potential US measures has already been 
mounting  in  China  and  India,  suggesting  that  retaliatory 
action and WTO challenges are likely.32 
The WTO has long acknowledged the potential for conflict 
between its rules and climate policies. However, WTO leaders 
have been reluctant to confront the challenges that are now 
plainly on the horizon. Pascal Lamy, director-general of the 
WTO, has repeatedly expressed his hope that an international 
agreement on climate change will be forged before the WTO 
begins work on the WTO compatibility of trade measures 
related to climate change. In light of the meagre Copenha-
gen results, this hope now seems forlorn. Lamy has asserted 
that WTO members do not want a separate Geneva-based 
WTO negotiation on permissible trade-related climate meas-
ures.33 After Copenhagen, that assertion can be questioned.3 
National legislation with major trade implications now seems 
destined to run far ahead of international talks. 
At the symposium on WTO institutional reforms held 
on November 30, 2009, Lamy said that he did not see a need 
for reform in relation to trade-related issues that might arise 
in the context of action on climate change. Lamy asserted that 
current WTO  agreements  and  the  guidance  established  by 
WTO legal decisions are enough to deal with those issues.35 
We  disagree.  Our  book  (Hufbauer,  Charnovitz,  and  Kim 
2009)  examines  core  positions  set  forth  in  the  text  of  the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO, 
and the decisions of the GATT panels and WTO Appellate 
Body. We concluded that existing WTO jurisprudence leaves 
ample room for conflicting interpretation of the core rules. 
We believe that latent conflicts would be better resolved by 
negotiating a new Code of Good Practice than by a long proc-
ess of WTO litigation. 
In our view, the WTO no longer enjoys the luxury of 
32. In our book Global Warming and the World Trading System, we concluded 
that grounds exist for challenging Waxman-Markey-type provisions under 
the terms of the WTO. See Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim (2009). This 
book provides detailed analysis of key GATT articles, WTO agreements, and 
the decisions of GATT panels and the WTO Appellate Body with respect to 
climate policy options under consideration.
33. See Lamy Sees Room for Climate Change Border Measures under WTO 
Rules. 2009. Inside US Trade. July 3. (Accessed via subscription.)
3. See Hufbauer and Kim (2009c) where we argued that compliance 
mechanisms within the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol are not designed to 
deal with trade issues. The Copenhagen Conference did nothing to change our 
assessment.
35. See Lamy Sees No Need For WTO Reforms To Tackle Climate Change 
Issues. 2009. Inside US Trade. (December ). (Accessed via subscription.) 
waiting for the UNFCCC to pronounce. A “head-in-the-sand” 
approach practically ensures that significant national legisla-
tion will be enacted without much guidance from the WTO 
system—even though, in his recent statement, Lamy said, “the 
more we move toward a multilateral framework on climate 
change, the more unilateral trade measures will be difficult 
to explain.”3 Once they are enacted, national statutes will 
be hard to change. Vested interests will quickly build. In our 
view, WTO leaders should grasp the climate file now, while 
national legislators are still in the midst of their own delibera-
tions. If the WTO does nothing more than call for a peace 
clause, that will be constructive. If it launches negotiations 
pointing toward a code of good practice on climate measures, 
that will be historic.37 
What’s Next? 
To deliver on their commitments relating to the Copenhagen 
Accord, Annex I parties are likely to put in place national 
GHG control programs, based on market mechanisms such 
as cap-and-trade systems or carbon taxes, along with tougher 
energy-related  standards.  The  European  Union  already  has 
its own cap-and-trade system in place, the Emission Trading 
Scheme  (ETS).38  Despite  the  disappointing  outcome  from 
Copenhagen, many countries will continue to enact GHG 
controls at the national, provincial, state, and city levels, seek-
ing a path to a low-carbon future. The big question is whether 
uncoordinated “bottom-up” action will suffice to meet the 
global 2 degrees Celsius cap and keep the GHG concentration 
level below the recommended level of 50 ppm. 
The UNFCCC summit to be hosted in Mexico in 2010, 
like Copenhagen in 2009, aims to produce a binding inter-
national agreement. But observers now speculate UN climate 
talks may follow the fate of the Doha Development Round of 
trade negotiations that has stalled almost since it was launched 
in November 2001. As with Doha, the UNFCCC talks will 
only succeed if the top 15 countries can first broker a deal 
between themselves.39 
3. See Lamy praises Copenhagen efforts, calls for more to be done. 2009. 
WTO News Items. (December 21). Available at http://www.wto.org. 
37. Hufbauer and Kim (2009c) explore options for managing future conflict 
between the existing WTO system and climate policies at national and 
international levels.
38. The ETS that was launched in 2005 has finished its three-year trial period 
(Phase I, 2005–07) and has now entered its second period (Phase II 2008–12). 
The European Parliament in 2008 approved a far-reaching climate action and 
energy package that will run starting in 2013. The European Union’s so-called 
20-20-20 plan envisages a stringent target of reducing GHG emissions at least 
20 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 and a 20 percent target share for renew-
able energies in energy use by 2020. 
39. The top 15 GHG emitters (including EU 27 as a group) accounted for N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 4   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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The Copenhagen talks made a clear case that nothing will 
be accomplished under a consensus procedure that requires 
assent from 192 member nations. Acknowledging the struc-
tural problem, Ban Ki-moon, UN secretary-general, promised 
that the UN “will consider how to streamline the negotiations 
process” and toward this end he will establish a high-level 
panel.0 In a New York Times op-ed, Frank Loy, former under-
secretary of state for Global Affairs and a former US climate 
negotiator, together with Michael A. Levi, a senior fellow for 
energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, argued that marginal actors should not be permitted to 
block progress. They added that future climate cooperation 
should be driven by whatever coalitions are best suited to the 
task—perhaps narrow groups like the Group of 20.1 In our 
view, a G-20 approach is most likely to succeed if the major 
countries can agree on several points:42
n	 the division between them of financial responsibility to the 
developing countries;
n	 a commitment to provide public funds if private funds are 
not forthcoming;
n	 a template of conditionality and MRV terms for develop-
ing countries that receive financial support;
n	 frequent review of emission control targets and measures, 
in light of the 2 degrees Celsius cap;
n	 a pledge to delay the implementation of border adjust-
ments on imports for five years while the major emitters 
attempt to negotiate a Code of Good Practice within the 
WTO.
about 79 percent of total world GHG emissions (excluding land-use change) 
in 2005. See Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 7.0 (Washing-
ton, DC: World Resources Institute, 2010). 
0. See Harvey, Fiona, Joshua Chaffin, and Harvey Morris. 2009. UN agrees 
to reform climate process. Financial Times. (December 22). Available at www.
ft.com. 
1. See Loy, Frank E., and Michael A. Levi. 2009. The Road from Copenha-
gen. New York Times, December 23. Available at www.nytimes.com. 
2. The G-20 includes most of top GHG emitting countries and accounted 
for about 77 percent of total world GHG emissions when including land-use 
change and about 79 percent when excluding land-use change in 2005. See 
Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 7.0 (Washington, DC: 
World Resources Institute, 2010).
Geoengineering in 2020?
If the UNFCCC, or narrower groups, continues to stumble 
without concluding hard commitments, if GHG concentra-
tions continue their upward trajectory, and if average tempera-
tures continue rising while ice caps continue melting, how 
will the climate debate look in 2020? A lot of “ifs” pepper 
this hypothetical question, and the world may turn out much 
happier. But if cooperative efforts do not turn the GHG corner, 
and if global warming creates severe hurricanes, widespread 
drought, and rising sea levels over the next decade, the public 
debate could turn to geoengineering. By geoengineering, we 
mean schemes to abate the rise of average temperature, such 
as by ejecting aerosols (akin to natural volcanic action) into 
the stratosphere, or salting the oceans with substances that 
promote the absorption of CO2. At that juncture the question 
will not be which countries should accept what level of manda-
tory emissions targets. The question will then be who decides 
whether the promise of geoengineering “solutions” is worth 
the unknown array of risks. We add this worrisome prospect 
to  other  powerful  reasons  for  reconfiguring  the  UNFCCC 
process so as to conclude politically binding obligations that 
embrace  all  major  emitters,  and  ensure  adequate  financial 
support to developing countries, sooner rather than later.3 
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